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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SILVER KING COALITION
:MINES COMPANY, a corporation
and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
CO 1IPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
vs.

8029

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and LORNA MITCHELL,
Widow of Glade Mitchell, Deceased,
Defendants.

PLAINTIF'FS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is here by certiorari to review an award of
the Industrial Commission of Utah to Lorna Mitchell
against the plaintiffs for the death of her husband
claimed to be due to an occupational disease, to wit:
silicosis.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

The case was heard by the Industrial Commission
January 28, 1953. On March 30, 1953, the Industrial
Conunission notified plaintiffs herein in writing that
it had made and entered its decision awarding Lorna
:Mitchell compensation, medical and hospital expenses
and burial allowance to be paid for by the plaintiffs
herein; on April24, 1953, plaintiffs applied to the Industrial Commission for rehearing which petition for rehearing, plaintiffs were notified on May 5, 1953, was denied.
On .:\lay 28, 1953, this court on petition of plaintiffs
1ssued a Writ of Certiorari to the Industrial Commission
bringing the record before this court for review (R. 89,
92, and amended Certificate of Commission).
Glade Mitchell, the deceased husband of the applicant Lorna Mitchell, was employed by the plaintiff Silver
King Coalition Mines Company from 1938 until June 15,
1949, on which date he left the employment and never
worked thereafter. He died July 21, 1952, slightly more
than three years and one month after leaving the emplo;yment of Silver King. Plaintiff Continental Casualty
Company at all times herein applicable was the compensation carrier for Silver King (R. 9, 10).
Glade Mitchell died July 21, 1952, at 3 :00 A. M., at
the Utah State Tuberculosis Sanitorium located at
Ogden, Utah, and on the same day at 8:45 P. M., an
autopsy was performed on his body by Robert W. Ogilvie, Pathologist, witnessed by Dr. Elmer Kilpatrick and
others (R. 53). The autopsy report states: " The cause
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
J

1

3
of death is believed to be due to a severe, chronic,
fibrocaseocavernous pneumonitis, probably tuberculous,
involving all lobes of both lungs and complicated by a
mild to moderate nodular silicosis." (R. 54.) Prior to
the autopsy there was never any diagnosis of the presence of silicosis. Numerous X-rays of this man were
taken fron1 tin1e to time which were submitted by the
Industrial Conunission to the Department of Health of
the Dominion of Canada for examination and report
(R. 64). This report of the Canadian Department of
Health shows the submis.sion and examination of X-ray's
taken October, 1947, then December, 1948, followed
by one in June of 1950, and a fourth one in December,
1950. The Canadian Clinician summarized his examination and opinion as follows:
"There is nothing in the shadowing to suggest
an occupation condition due to dust inhalation.
The shadowing suggests an infectious process
which may be: 1. A pneumonitis of unknown
origin. 2. Pulmonary tuberculosis. 3. Histoplastmosis or ·some other form of fungus infection."
(R. 64).
There were also examinations by the Medical Panel
under our Occupational Disease Law on November 18,

1950 (R. 69), January 20, 1951 (R. 66), reports from
Dr. Wilson on his X-rays showing no indication of
silicosis (R. 72), a letter from Dr. Kilpatrick discussing
the X-rays and the physical examinations of the employee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
in which Dr. Kilpatrick ·stated under date of October
~s, 1950, more than 2 years after the deceased left our
employtnent:
"Dr. Walker and myself feel that this man
does not have clinical silicosis but he does have
~ouw infectious process in the lungs most likely
tuberculosis but still not prorven by bacteriology.
Other causes for the lung disease might include
mycotic infection or malignant disease metaJstatic
from some area elsewhere in the body. If this
latter process should be a condition involving the
1ungs, the source is not as yet evident.
"In view of the complete review of this case
we believe that ~Ir. Mitchell should be denied compensation at the present time, pending observation for at least another three to six months. We
do not say that he has not had some silaceous. dust
in his lungs but we do feel that he does not have
clinical silicosis which could be recognized as a
disabling entity in any respect. On the other hand
we are still not entirely able to make a definite
dogmatic diagnosis. If his pulmonary condition
should eventually prove to be tuberculous in
origin and if hi& progress continues to be satisfactory, the infiltrates which are now evident by
the X-ray film should largely clear up as. his
condition improves." (R. 74)
Dr. Kilpatrick's opinion of the results of the autopsy
is not only interesting, but extremely important in this
case. On August 26, 1952, he wrote to the Industrial
Commission his views of the autopsy. Among other
things he stated:
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··It was obviously present at the autopsy table,
that a clinical diagnosis from X-ray nodulation
could not be made in tllis patient and it was both
of our feelings (he and Dr. Ogilvie) that clinical
silicosis did not exist. **********
··From study of the complete autopsy report,
microscopic analysis of the tissue, and chemical
analysis of the tissues for silica it can be concluded that :Mr. :Mitchell did have silico~sis in a
comparatively minor degree, which seemingly has
been a complication of his tuberculosis." (R. 3).
Even with the autopsy report there still is no clinical
silicosis and such silicosis as is disclosed by microscopic
and chemical analysis is of a comparatively minor
degree.
There never was an X-ray of Glade MitcheH showing
a characteristic X-ray pattern of silicosis, nor were there
ever clinical manifestations ·of silicosis, nor does the
autopsy report nor any of the other medical reports show
the presence of silicosis ·(R. 41 and the other reports
already specified) as defined in 35-2-28 UCA 1953, (same:
as 42-la-29 UCA 1943), as follows:
"For the purpose of this a~t 'silicosis' is
defined as a chronic disease of the lungs caused
by the prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust
( Si02) characterized by small discrete nodules
of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated throughout both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray
pattern, and by variable clinical manifestations."
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Section 35-2-29 UCA 1953 which is the same as

'
St-et.ion 42-la-30 UCA 1943, provides,
"In case of disability or death from silicosis complicated with tuberc.·ulo~is of the lungs, eompensation shall be payable ·as for
disability or death from uncomplicated silicosis." 'The
n•cord in this case discloses that silicosis per se is never
fatal no matter what the degree of silicosis (R. 39).
Aside from the autopsy there is no evidence whatthat Glade ::"tlitchell even had silicosis and the most
that the autopsy discloses is that there was present "a
n1ild to moderate nodular silicosis." The silicosis according to the autopsy was not complicated with tuberculosis,
but the tuberculosis was complicated with a mild to
moderate silicosis. Dr. Ogilvie states that the chemical
analysis showed a considerable quantity of silicon dioxide
'"there being 12.84 milligrams per gram of dried node."
l'Vl'r

The attorney for the applicant Mrs. Mitchell then asked
Dr. Ogilvie:
And I ask you whether or not that is in excess
of the amount normally present~
A. Not in a great deal of studies that have been
made on nodes, as to silica content. So that
such a question is difficult to interpret." (R.
27, 28).

"Q.

This nodulation was. not "similarly disseminated
throughout both lungs" as is indicated by the following
questions and answers by applicant's attorney to Dr.
Ogilvie and his answers :
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"Q. So that both of these samples, or specimens,
were taken from the lung tissue, the, gross
lungt
A.

\Yell, lung and hilar region. It's not a part
of the lung itself.

Q. But it is a part of the respiratory
A.

system~

\Vell, it's right at the root of the lung, and
receives the drainage of lymphati0s from the
lung tissue itself." (R. 28.)

It is true that Dr. Paul S. Richards, who was called
as a witness for the plaintiffs and later was made a
witness for the applicant, was questioned by the referee
as follows:

"Q. Dr. Richards, were you a member of the
committee which drew up the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law~
A.

Yes. And when I see other laws, I'm proud
of it.

Q. 1 will call your attention particularly to
Sectiorn 42-la, on page 29 of the law, which is
the definition of silicosis, and I will ask you
if, in your opinion, the process which was
demonstrated by autopsy meets that definition of silicosis.
A.

Yes Sir." (R. 44, 45.)

The doctor was thus called upon to make a legal intre'pretation of our statute although even the autopsy failed
to disclose nodulation similarly disseminated throughout
both lungs, and such nodulation as there was showed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of silicosis only to a mild or moderate degree.

Al,st·ut the autopsy all the evidence disclosed that the
t·aust' of tl1is man's death no doubt was tuberculosis, and
t'\'Pil tlw autopsy says that is a probable cause.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 42-la-13 (b) (3) UCA 1943, HAD NO APPLICATION,
BUT THAT THE AMENDMENT OF 1951, NOW 35-2-13 (b)
(3) UCA 1953 WAS APPLICABLE.

POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE DECEASED DIED AS
A RESULT OF SILICOSIS AS DEFINED BY THE LAWS OF
UTAH.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 42-1a-13 (b) (3) UCA 1943, HAD NO APPLICATION,
BUT THAT THE AMENDMENT OF 1951, NOW 35-2-13 (b)
(3) UCA 1953 WAS APPLICABLE.

The deceased left our employment June 15, 1949.
He never worked again, was repeatedly examined clinically and by X-ray, and died July 21, 1952, a little more
than three years and one month after he left our emploifment (R. 9, 10). While he was employed by us and at the
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time he left our employment, Section -!2-1a-13 (h) (3)
FC~-\. 1943 wa8 in effect and provided as follows:

·•No compensation shall be paid for death
from silicosis unless the death results within two
years from the last day upon which the en1ployee
actually worked for the employer against whom
compensation is claimed, except in those cas.e,s
where death results during the period of continuous total disability fron1 silicosis for which compensation has been paid or awarded, and in such
cases compensation shall be paid if such death
results within five years from the last day upon
which the employee actually worked for the
employer against whom compensation is claimed."
No compensation was ever paid or awarded to the:
employee.

In 1951 this section was amended and is now found
in UGA 1953 as 35-2-13 (b) (3). The amendment added

a new provision reading as follows :
"or (b) in those cases where death results
from silicosis co·mplicated by active tuberculo'sis
and such silico. . tuberculosis is evidenced by positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays and
other clinical findings, and in such cases compensation shall be paid if such death results within
five years from the last day upon which the
employee actually worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed."
(Under Point II we shall contend that the evidence
here does not even comply with this provision, but for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the purpose of discussing Point I we will assume that
the statute waH antended to extend the period from two
year~ to five years.)
rrhe <'OUJ't Will note that the foregoing statutes
imp<):)e on every employer a liability for the payment of
<'Oiltpen~ation to dependents of employees whose de·ath
results from an occupational disease and the prorvisions
of the ::5tatute authorizing recovery also specify as a part
of the right the tune within which the action shall be
brought. The courts of this country uniforntly hold
that such lilniting provisions are not statutes of limitation but are qualifications and conditions restricting the
rights granted by the statutes and must be strictly complied with. They cannot be made retroactive. The
Supreme Court of the United States in Western Fuel
Com,parvy vs. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 66 L. Ed. 210, specifi-

cally held that the limitation of time in the death statute
was not a statute of limitation, but was a part of the
right itself. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Michigan
in Bement vs Grand Rapids and I Ry. Co-., 160 N. W.

424, declared that when a statute creates a right conditioned on its enforcement within a specified time that
is not a limitation .of remedy but is a part of the right
itself; that the tilne :specified is a limitation of the
liability itself.
See also Mejia vs. U. 8. 152 Fed. (2d) 686 (5th Cir.
La. 1946), Sebol vs. Peeoe, 76 N. E. (2d) 84 (Ohio, 1947).
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This court held in Pacific Employers I nsuranc:e
Company t:s. Industrial Comm~·ssion, 108 U 123, 157 P.
(:2d) 800, 803, that the date of the last exposure is the
date which fixes the liability of the employer and consequently also attaches liability to the employer's insurance carrier as of that date. The last exposure was June
15, 1949.
Our statute 68-3-3 UCA 1953 provides that "No part
of these reYised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly
so declared." There is not such declaration in the 1951
amendment, nor in the 1953 Code. It seems quite clear
that the statute creating the right also limited the time
for its application; that time expired and with it expired
the right.
This employee terminated his employment with us
June 15, 1949. At that time the law provided that his
death must occur within two ye'ars from the termination
of his employment in order to hold us liable. The time
period in the statute was a part of the dependents' rights
and a part of oor liability and it became fixed when the
basis of the right, the employment, was terminated.

/

The only way that we could be held liable at all
would be because of the existence between us and the
deceased of the employer-employee relationship. That
relationship is the basis of the right. When that relationship ends our liability is fixed as are also the rights of
the employee and his dependents. No subsequent legisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lation could operate to increase our liability or decrease
the c·n•ployee'~ rights. They were fixed. As was corn·dly ruled by the Hupreme Court of Connecticut in
(jui/1.'1 l's. Conul'cl'icut Comparn.y, 113 Atl. 149 (1921).
The (·lailllant urged that the statute was merely pro('l'dnral, that the right to compensation did not arise
until dPatl1. Between the injury and death the law was
u1ateriall y amended and the claimant contended for
reeoYery under the amendment. However the Connecti.
'
cut Court held that as the right to compensation arises
from the employer-employee relationship, the time limit
was a substantive obligation and that a later amendment
cannot alter or extend the rights and liabilities. See
also Atamanick vs. Real Estate Management, New
Jersey, 1952, 91 Atl. (2d) 268.

Stansu·sky vs. Industrial Commission (ill., 1931)
176 N. E. 898 followed by Playhouse Theatre vs. Industrial Commission, 179 N. E. 89 (TIL, 1932), hold that the
rights and liabilities are fixed at the date of injury not
the death. If between injury and death the statute is
amended and the right to an award because of death
occurs after the amendment, the law as it existed prior
to the amendment is controlling and not the amendment.
See also Draper vs. Draper & Sons, 195 N. Y. S. 162.
Thorpe vs. Department of Labor and Industries of
Washifn.gton (1927) 261 P. 85, holds that the amount of
the award for death of an employee is governed by the
law in force at the time of injury and not those in force
at the time of death. 'The Supreme Court of Wyoming
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the case of the Claim of Heil, 197 P. (~d) GD~, at page
696 discusses a X ew York ease, Sch;nidt vs. Wolfe Contracting Company, 55 N. Y. S. (~d) Hi~, frequently cited
as an authority giving retrospective effect to compensation statutes and concludes that that case is out of
harmony with eYery other jurisdiction and that twenty
states and national jurisdictions uphold the rule that a
compensation statute is never given retroactive effect
and "assuming that the legislature had the power to
make the la:\v of 1927 applicable to claims for injuries
sustained before its enactment we should not give it
that construction if it be susceptible· of any other."

In Riggs ~·s. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., (1921) 131
N. E. 231, the Indiana Court states the reason for the rule
as follows;
"To permit subsequent legislation to increase
or diminish the compensation specified in awards
would be to strike down vested rights. Then no
one would be secure. The resulting uncertainty,
distrust and confusion would destroy the compensation plan itself. To give to the amendment
the effect desired by the appellant would be· to
confer on the child a substantive right which she
did not possess at the time of the injury and death
of her father, and to impose on the employer a
burden not imposed by the law at that time, and
would be giving an unwarranted retroactive effect
to the amendment."
It must be remembered that in this state the right
to recover for death from an occupational disease is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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purely statutory. Under the workman's compensation
law the legislature was prohibited until the 1921 constitutional amend1nent frmn abrogating actions for death
frou1 injuries which, of course, means actions for negligence causing death. In 1921 the constitution was
amPnded to give the legislature the right in compens·ation
<·a:-;Ps to legislate for death from injuries. However, this
con:-;titutional amendment has no application to occupational diseases as we are concerned with them in the
case at bar.
There is no attempt in the case at bar to hold the
~ilver IGng Coalition Mines Company guilty of negligence in causing the alleged silicosis or tuberculosis
which were the reported causes of death. The action here
is purely ~tatutory with no reference whatsoever to the
constitution or the amendment thereto in 1921. The
applicant, the widow of the employee, is solely dependent
upon the statute for any right that she has. The statute
that granted her the right only because of the employeremployee relationship also specified the limits of our
liability arising from that relationship. When that relationship ended, her rights and our liability were fixed.
Even in workman's compensation cases we have
seen that the courts hold that because the liability arises
from the employer-employee relationship, the rights are
fixed by law at the date of the injury and a subsequent
statutory amendment can neither enlarge nor diminish
them. This court recently discussed the effect of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutional amendment in Henrie vs. Rocky It! ounta·in
Packing Corpora.tion, 113 U. 415, 196 P. (2d) 487. But,
of course, that case is not in point here. If the
employee had pressed his claiin for compensation during
his lifeti1ne undoubtedly it would have been denied on
the basis of the record now before this court since he
would have had no evidence whatever of an occupational
disease as defined by our statute. There was no award of
compensation and no compensation had been paid. The
death occurred more than two years after he left our employment. The applicant's rights expired before the
employe's death.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE DECEASED DIED AS
A RESULT OF SILICOSIS AS DEFINED BY THE LAWS OF
UTAH.

Point II is probably not too important in this case
since clearly the applicant's right expired long before
the death of her husband. However, it would be helpful
if this court would tell us wh~ther or not the definition
of silicosis in our Code means what is says. It must be
assumed that the legislature knew what it was doing
when it passed the Occupational Disease Statute defining
silicosis in specific terms.
Apparently the legislature when it first enacted the
Occupational Disease Statute felt that silicosis as a eause
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of d<·ath wai-i very questionable. Dr. Paul S. Richards in
thii-i <"ai-ie a:-5 we have already pointed out, says that
UJl('Olupli<·at<'d silicosit-; is never a cause of death. The
leg-i:-daturP definitely did not allow recovery for death
froJtl t uh<>r<·ttlosi:-5. It apparently felt, however, that if
the <'HlpJoye<~ had become afflicted with silicosis, and
that tlu·n tuhereulosis ensued as a result, there should
h<· a l'«'<·overy. lt is somewhat anomalous to learn that
Dr. Hi('hards h<·Jped to draw the Occupational Disease
Law which provides that when silicosi~s is complicated
with tuberculosis of the lungs the compensation shall
be payable as for disability or death from uncomplicated
silicosis, when Dr. Richards expressly testifies that there
is never death or injury from uncomplicated silicosis.
Be all that as it Inay, our statute says that silicosis to
be compensable n1ust cause a characteristic X-ray pattern; that it n1ust be similarly disseminated throughout
both lungs, that there must be "variable clinical manifestations." None of these requirements appear here.
Even the a1nendment of 1951 requires in order to apply
the fi Ye-year provision that there be, "or (b) in those
cases where death results from silicosis complicated by
active tuberculosis and such silico-tuberculosis is evidenced by positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays
and other clinical findings." (Emphasis added.) In this

case there were no positive sputum tests, there were no
X-ray findings, no clinical finding, variable or otherwise,
so that there is no evidence of the existence of silicosis
as defined in the Occupational Disease Act.
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It semns to us that the facts in this

en~e clearly

demonstrate the reason for the requirement~ in the
legislative definition. If silicosis is to be considered as
a death causing factor it must be of such an extent that
it will be disclosed by an X-ray, it must be extensive, it
must be similarly disseminated throughout both lungs,
there must be clinical evidence. In the case at bar the
silicosis did not even appear in an X -ray and such findings as we have, not clinical but microscopic and chemical,
show only the presence of a mild to moderate silicosis.
The legislature must have felt that under such circumstances silicosis could not be the cause of death, and
therefore, the employer should not be subjected to liability in a case such as we have here.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the applicant's claim
for compensation never did arise and that under the
evidence in this case there is no silicosis for which compensation could be paid. The award of the Industrial
Commission should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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